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Panorama.am interviews Dr. Janusz Bugajski, Director of the Lavrentis Lavrentiadis Chair from Center for Strategic and International Studies, or CSIS, Washington DC.

Panorama: What are the main differences between the Nagorno Karabakh and Kosovo issues? Do you find the advisory opinion of ICJ with regards to Kosovo (July 22, 2010) applicable to the other unrecognized entities such as Nagorno Karabakh?

Bugajski: Although every separatist dispute has a different historical, demographic, and political context, the ICJ verdict on Kosova will reinvigorate disputes between proponents and opponents of national sovereignty for minority populations inhabiting delineated territories. The key criterion on which independence should be based is whether the compact territorially-based minority has been subjected to mass expulsion or attempted genocide by the existing state. This was clearly the case with the Kosova Albanians at the hands of the Serbian government and legitimizes their struggle for separation. One needs to look at the historical record and contemporary evidence to decide which governments or ethnic leaders were primarily responsible for mass murders and expulsions in territories such as Nagorno-Karabakh in order to decide whether the separation of these territories is justified on the grounds of incompatible cohabitation in the same state structure.

Panorama: Do you agree with the assumption that international relations and politics are primarily based on so-called "double standards" and ignore the international law?

Bugajski: International relations and inter-state politics are based on a mixture of elements including diplomacy, mutuality, enticement, inducement, dominance, threat, and force. There is no single standard or even a double standard as each case has differing components. Although the United Nations poses as the dispensary of international law, in reality it is not a model of international legality let alone a moral or ethical compass. For instance, the UN accepted East European borders that were primarily established by force under Stalin’s conquest and acquiesced to the occupation of half of Europe and the loss of state independence to the Soviet Union for 45 years. In the contemporary setting, we cannot hide behind alleged international law and allow states to murder or abuse their own minority populations. Sometimes military intervention is necessary and sometimes state separation is essential.

Panorama: How do you estimate the regional politics of the Obama Administration in the South Caucasus and Central Asia? Where do you see primary differences with regards to the Bush Administration era? Do you agree with those saying this Administration pays less attention to these regions so far, "giving" the region to Russia?

Bugajski: One shortcoming of President Obama’s approach has been its inability or unwillingness to clearly articulate U.S. security interests and strategic goals in the wider European, Caucasian, and Central Asian regions, even if these are not currently overarching national priorities. As a result, Washington is perceived as surrendering these regions to predominant Russian influence. U.S. and Western interests can be encapsulated in at least four policy objectives: first, consolidating bilateral partnerships and regional alliances to prevent the emergence of weak, fractured, or conflicted states that undermine regional security; second, precluding the expansion of any dominant regional power or regional alliance that challenges broader American interests and even the American presence; third, involving a diverse array of states to assist Washington and NATO in combating common threats stemming from the broader Middle East and South Asia; and fourth, ensuring the development of energy resources and their secure transportation from the Caspian Basin to Europe via the Caucasus and Black Sea region to uphold the stability of America’s European allies.