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Armenia’s third President Serzh Sargsyan sat down for an exclusive interview with ArmNews TV channel on Monday, talking about the negotiation process for the conflict resolution in Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh). 

Interviewer: You have always said that Nagorno-Karabakh will never be part of Azerbaijan. In your latest party congress, you said that Artsakh will always remain Armenian, and the ruling party has attempted to fish for some verbal nuances in your statement.

Serzh Sargsyan: But is there any difference? I mean – what does “only Armenian” mean, can you explain?

Interviewer: That Armenian Artsakh cannot be part of Azerbaijan.

Serzh Sargsyan: Of course, it cannot. Maybe I am rushing it and answering some questions that you have not yet asked, including some of his so-called ‘arguments’, such as - what would happen if there were elections held and Azeris elected… What are we? Some fascists? Are we racists to argue that the parliament of Artsakh has to be made up of only Armenians? If it consists of not only Armenians, how does it mean it’s no more Armenian? Are there only Armenians elected in the Armenian National Assembly today? What does it all mean? If this is yet another manipulation, it’s a failed one. If this is – what can I say – an issue about lack of knowledge, then it’s ridiculous. What I am saying is, of course, also a message to the international community, because the very same co-chairmen, even after the disastrous war still were speaking about the basic principles.

Interviewer: Mr. President, I would like to ask you react on a few arguments that were voiced by the Prime Minister in the course of the past few press conferences. First, the Prime Minister spoke a few times about a certain radical turning-point in the Nagorno Karabakh negotiation process in 2016. In every fitting occasion he labeled that ‘a catastrophe’. What happened after the April war and – I quote his claims – at that time Karabakh has lost every practical and theoretical chances of ever being outside of Azerbaijan. I would like to unequivocally clarify with you: in order to stop the war as soon as possible, in four days, or in the bilateral negotiations afterwards, or those under the auspices and with the participation of the co-chairs, has there been any concession forced onto the Armenian side with regards to the interim or final status of Nagorno-Karabakh; and has the Armenian side agreed to any such concession, I mean have we traded over that issue at all? The Prime Minister alleges that indeed, in 2016 it was the Armenian side that backpedalled on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Serzh Sargsyan: Absolutely, there have been absolutely no pressure or concession, no written or verbal agreement or arrangement, and I have spoken about that. When I was speaking about the April war and when there was the Commission of Inquiry etc, I had very openly said that there had been only a verbal agreement to stop the war, while they were claiming that maybe there had been some written document, or some concession etc.

Interviewer: The Azeris were suggesting to sign a new ceasefire agreement, which you were against…

Serzh Sargsyan: Absolutely. We had not agreed to any new document or any verbal agreement. That had been confirmed by the co-chairs, when they publicly stated that there was no new document and that the trilateral agreement signed in 1994 remained in force.

Interviewer: So, the price for stopping the war was neither relinquishing any of the principles, nor any of the elements. 

Serzh Sargsyan: Absolutely! What regards to the 2016 document, if you noticed, in between the lines there he was speaking about some letters and what not, and would not clearly say exactly what proposals were made by the co-chairmen in 2016, when those proposals were tabled, etc.

Indeed, in 2016 – that is after the April war – we did receive some proposals by the co-chairmen. And those proposals in no ways violated the red lines that we had always had. Let me reiterate again, that those red lines were the following: first – self-determination of Nagorno Karabakh, second – land border between Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh, third – recognition of Nagorno Karabakh authorities by the international community as legitimately elected officials, and many other such [features] that was [in entirety] called interim status. In one place it was called Nagorno Karabakh interim status, in other file it was called temporary status, somewhere else it was called recognised status. And fourth – something that was based on or was uniting the preceding three aspects in one – was the security guarantees. In our opinion the most important security guarantee was [Nagorno Karabakh’s] independence and it was the opportunity to influence all processes in a legitimate manner – be those security issues or others.

There was no reservation regarding any of these four elements.

Interviewer: Plus, the necessity of introduction of monitoring mechanisms was also added…

Serzh Sargsyan: No, it was formulated slightly differently there, since there would be no need in monitoring given the peacekeeping forces were going to be dispatched to be lined up between two conflicting sides.

Interviewer: I rather meant, Mr. President, the parties had such obligation before conflict resolution to make room for a monitoring mission.

Serzh Sargsyan: That was in the form of statements in Vienna and St Petersburg in 2016, which of course was quite advantageous for the Armenian party, but none of that was any solution to the problem. That was very specific means which would exclude future hostilities.

Interviewer: Until a resolution was found?

Serzh Sargsyan: Yes, until some resolution was found.

Pertaining to the UN Security Council, which to my bemusement is called ‘a catastrophe’, I have to say that it has always been the perception that a UN Security Council resolution [would be necessary]. If someone, who wants to speak about this topic, got detailed understanding of the Kazan document, they would see that the document, or that declaration, had it been accepted, it would need to be approved by the UN Security Council, since it included certain provisions that are generally within the powers of the UN, while the OSCE and moreover its Minsk Group, would not have been in the position of adopting such decisions.

Interviewer: Do you mean that a UN Security Council resolution was being spoken about even before the April war?

Serzh Sargsyan: This idea or such a concept was featured in all of the documents. It was not inscribed in any of the documents that exactly that one has to be sent to the UN Security Council. Why am I putting it this way? Because in 2016 we were offered a docket with three different documents in it. I have already spoken about this in other occasions: one was meant to be a Declaration between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The second one was to be a joint statement adopted by the Foreign Ministers of the co-chairing countries, which had to include certain elements that were not acceptable for Azerbaijan and Azerbaijani President did not want those to be part of the bilateral document; and third document was a draft UN Security Council resolution which was wrapping up or was interweaving the other two documents and was also adding some other provisions on its own behalf.

Interviewer: Now look, Mr. President – the Prime Minister is saying something exactly opposite. He says that it was after the April war that this issue was delegated to the UN Security Council and links it to that disaster in 2016. Moreover, he reminds about the four UN Security Council resolutions adopted in 1993 which included some anti-Armenian wordings, and raises an issue by suggesting the new UNSC resolution could declare the territory of Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast belonging to Azerbaijan.

Serzh Sargsyan: Now exactly what you are saying confirms the fact that this man does not understand the negotiation process and not only misses the details of the negotiation process, but is clueless about its essence. First, what do the UNSC resolutions of 1993 have to do with this? Those were about a completely different issue. All those resolutions adopted in 1993 were calling for cessation of armed hostilities. Those were meant to decide neither on the status, nor anything else for that matter.

And the claim that the [new] UN Security Council resolution would not be adopted raises a question: exactly what line of argumentation does he rely on to yield such a conclusion?